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VERIFIED, UNKNOWN or MISMATCH: Reading an Image Lineage Record

By the Ingenious AI team · Published: November 14, 2026 · Reviewed: November 14, 2026 · 8 min read

The short answer

Read them literally. VERIFIED means the held bytes were recomputed on this view and matched, link by link. UNKNOWN means the step was declared, no output bytes are held, and it will never be upgraded by trust. MISMATCH means bytes are held but the recomputed hash differs, reported as a failure with an action. The value of the whole chain is that these words are never blurred.

Seal an image free → Recover a reposted image Pricing

Most record systems have one quiet scandal: a status that means 'probably fine'. A three-state chain with an honest UNKNOWN is designed to make that scandal impossible.

Lineage extends the record from a single sealing moment to a chain. A lineage record links an asset's stages by content hashes: the origin upload, each transformation executed locally, and each declared external step, with signed assertions tying the links together. Local steps such as stripping metadata or re-encoding as JPEG at quality 82 are executed on the actual held bytes, so their after-hashes are recomputed and checked. Declared steps, like a publish to an external platform, are recorded as declared, with whatever evidence exists attached to them.

What is lineage states? the three readings of a lineage link: VERIFIED, where held bytes recompute to the recorded hash; UNKNOWN, where the step was declared and no bytes are held; and MISMATCH, where held bytes recompute to a different hash and the link is reported as failed.

What goes wrong without a plan for reading lineage states

The chain is read through three states, and the discipline is in never blurring them. VERIFIED means ProvenanceGuard holds the step's output bytes and the recomputed hash matches the record, link by link. UNKNOWN means the step was declared rather than executed here, so there are no held bytes to recompute from; it stays unknown forever, however trustworthy the declarant. MISMATCH means bytes are held but the recomputed hash differs from the record, which is reported as a failure with an action, not smoothed over. Those three words, used strictly, are what make a lineage record worth reading.

The limits deserve the same prominence as the features. ProvenanceGuard does not detect deepfakes, does not judge whether an image is harmful, and does not verify that a creator's declared disclosure is true; it records declarations, binds them to fingerprints, and makes them checkable. Its signed assertion is its own XMP-embedded, HMAC-signed statement, explicitly not a C2PA manifest and not a certification by any standards body. Survival re-checks are local simulations of documented platform transforms, not actual uploads, and they are labelled that way in every result.

What the inspection, seal and registry each contribute

Used inside those limits, the record is strong. Used outside them, by claiming a seal proves authorship in law, or that a simulation proves a platform's behaviour, or that a registry match proves ownership, the same record becomes a liability, because the first competent challenge will find the overclaim. The teams that get the most from provenance tooling are the ones whose public language is as precise as the tool's own: sealed, registered, verifiable, with the dates and hashes to show it.

Checking a copy is the mirror image of sealing one. On an asset's verification page, uploading a candidate copy runs the same byte inspection on it and compares it against the record: its SHA-256 against the original and sealed hashes, whether a ProvenanceGuard assertion is present and its signature valid, and the perceptual distance between the copy and the registered fingerprint, with a match at a Hamming distance of ten or under on the average hash, or an exact hash match. The result states which of those held and which did not, separately, instead of collapsing them into one vague verdict.

The honest limits

For libraries rather than single files, bulk verification is a paid API feature: submit up to a hundred SHA-256 hashes in one call and get back, per hash, whether it is registered, its exhibit ID, its public verification URL and its registration time. That shape suits the questions teams actually ask at scale: whether everything in a delivered campaign folder was sealed, whether a partner's asset library overlaps the registry, or whether a month of published images all carry records. Single lookups stay free and public through the verification page and the single-hash API.

No single layer does this job alone, and honest tooling says so. Embedded metadata can be stripped. A visible label can be cropped. A fingerprint can drift if an image is edited heavily. A registry entry proves registration, not authorship in a legal sense. Used together, though, the layers cover each other's failures: when the metadata is gone the fingerprint can still find the registry record, and when a copy is too altered to match, the labelled version and the evidence pack still tell the story.

Decisions to make before you publish

ProvenanceGuard is built around those layers, and its wording is deliberately narrow. The free job inspects one JPEG or PNG, embeds a signed ProvenanceGuard assertion in XMP, produces a visibly labelled copy, registers the SHA-256 and perceptual fingerprints, and gives the asset a public verification page. The assertion is HMAC-signed and labelled accurately everywhere as ProvenanceGuard's own assertion; it is not a C2PA manifest and is never described as one.

Provenance is the record of where a piece of content came from and what has happened to it since: who or what created it, when it was registered, and which copies descend from the original. For an AI-generated image that record matters because the file itself is easy to copy, rename, crop and re-upload, and none of those actions leaves a reliable trace inside a filename. A provenance record kept outside the file, in a registry keyed to the file's fingerprints, survives exactly the handling that erases the signals embedded in the file.

Five actions to take

  1. Treat every UNKNOWN as a prompt to attach evidence, never as an error to hide
  2. Investigate a MISMATCH before anything downstream of that link is relied on
  3. Export an evidence pack while the context is fresh if the asset is regulated, client-facing or likely to be questioned
  4. Re-check one published asset through the Recovery lookup so you know the stripped-copy path works before you need it
  5. Seal the final export of the asset, with the creator and disclosure declared in your own accurate words

A worked example: A compliance reviewer auditing 12 lineage chains

She found 31 VERIFIED local links, 9 UNKNOWN declared publishes, and 1 MISMATCH where a held file had been replaced by a recompressed copy; the mismatch, not the unknowns, triggered the only follow-up, which is exactly the triage the states exist to produce.

What the case really shows is timing. Every artefact used, the registry entry, the fingerprint match, the pack, existed because someone spent a few minutes at publication. The same team, equally honest, starting from memory a month later would have had a much harder week.

FAQ

Can an UNKNOWN step become VERIFIED later?

Only by evidence, not by confidence: if the step's actual output file is later supplied and its hash recorded, that is a new recorded fact. The original declaration is never silently upgraded, because the chain's credibility rests on that refusal.

Are my uploaded originals stored?

No. The registry keeps the sealed and labelled copies derived at sealing time and the registry record, so downloads and verification keep working, while the uploaded original bytes are not retained.

Can anyone verify a record, or only the owner?

Anyone. Verification pages are public by design, the single-hash lookup is a public API, and an exhibit ID or a file hash is enough. A record only its owner could check would not settle a dispute with a stranger.

Is ProvenanceGuard's assertion a C2PA manifest?

No. It is ProvenanceGuard's own signed assertion, embedded as XMP and HMAC-signed, and labelled that way everywhere. The inspection detects genuine C2PA markers when a file carries them, but the two records are never conflated.

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