ProvenanceGuard
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How to Verify an Image's Provenance With a Hash or Exhibit ID

By the Ingenious AI team · Published: November 14, 2026 · Reviewed: November 14, 2026 · 8 min read

The short answer

There are three doors. With an exhibit ID, open the public verification page. With a SHA-256, query the single-hash verification API, which returns registration, exhibit, time and verification URL. With a file in hand, use check-a-copy on the asset's page: it inspects the copy, tests its assertion's signature, and measures its perceptual distance to the record. All three are public and free.

Seal an image free → Recover a reposted image Pricing

Verification is the moment provenance stops being a promise by the publisher and becomes a fact a stranger can establish alone, which is the only version that settles arguments.

Checking a copy is the mirror image of sealing one. On an asset's verification page, uploading a candidate copy runs the same byte inspection on it and compares it against the record: its SHA-256 against the original and sealed hashes, whether a ProvenanceGuard assertion is present and its signature valid, and the perceptual distance between the copy and the registered fingerprint, with a match at a Hamming distance of ten or under on the average hash, or an exact hash match. The result states which of those held and which did not, separately, instead of collapsing them into one vague verdict.

What is provenance verification? confirming, against a registry record, that a given file or hash was registered, when, and with what declared creator and disclosure, and whether a candidate copy matches the registered fingerprints.

Why verifying an image matters

For libraries rather than single files, bulk verification is a paid API feature: submit up to a hundred SHA-256 hashes in one call and get back, per hash, whether it is registered, its exhibit ID, its public verification URL and its registration time. That shape suits the questions teams actually ask at scale: whether everything in a delivered campaign folder was sealed, whether a partner's asset library overlaps the registry, or whether a month of published images all carry records. Single lookups stay free and public through the verification page and the single-hash API.

The registry is the part that survives distribution. At sealing, the asset's SHA-256, its sealed copy's SHA-256, and its perceptual fingerprints are stored against a public exhibit ID. Anyone with that ID, or with the file's hash, can open the public verification page or query the verification API and confirm that this exact file, or a near copy of it, was registered, when, and with what declared creator and disclosure. Verification pages are public by design: a record only a vendor can check would not settle disputes.

How the record is built

Two kinds of fingerprint do two kinds of work. The SHA-256 is exact: change one byte and it changes completely, which makes it perfect for proving a copy is bit-for-bit the registered file and useless for recognising a resized repost. The perceptual fingerprints, computed from the pixels rather than the bytes, are approximate on purpose: they stay close when a copy is resized, re-encoded or lightly edited, and drift as edits accumulate. A good registry stores both and is honest about which kind of match it is reporting.

The registry model also disciplines what a match means. A fingerprint match says this image is the registered image or a close descendant of it; it does not say the person showing it to you owns it, and it does not say the disclosure attached to it was correct. Those judgements stay human. What the registry removes is the argument about identity and timing: which file, registered when, carrying which declaration. Most real disputes shrink considerably once those three facts stop being contestable.

Where it meets the real world

Provenance is the record of where a piece of content came from and what has happened to it since: who or what created it, when it was registered, and which copies descend from the original. For an AI-generated image that record matters because the file itself is easy to copy, rename, crop and re-upload, and none of those actions leaves a reliable trace inside a filename. A provenance record kept outside the file, in a registry keyed to the file's fingerprints, survives exactly the handling that erases the signals embedded in the file.

The practical problem is distribution. An image is rarely published once, in one place, in its original form. It is uploaded to platforms that resize and re-encode it, forwarded by partners, saved and reposted by audiences, and archived by people who strip whatever context surrounded it. Each step is normal and usually innocent, yet together they separate the image from anything that said how it was made. Planning for that separation, rather than hoping it will not happen, is the whole discipline this guide is about.

Putting it into practice

No single layer does this job alone, and honest tooling says so. Embedded metadata can be stripped. A visible label can be cropped. A fingerprint can drift if an image is edited heavily. A registry entry proves registration, not authorship in a legal sense. Used together, though, the layers cover each other's failures: when the metadata is gone the fingerprint can still find the registry record, and when a copy is too altered to match, the labelled version and the evidence pack still tell the story.

ProvenanceGuard is built around those layers, and its wording is deliberately narrow. The free job inspects one JPEG or PNG, embeds a signed ProvenanceGuard assertion in XMP, produces a visibly labelled copy, registers the SHA-256 and perceptual fingerprints, and gives the asset a public verification page. The assertion is HMAC-signed and labelled accurately everywhere as ProvenanceGuard's own assertion; it is not a C2PA manifest and is never described as one.

Five actions to take

  1. Verify against the registry, never against the sender's screenshot of a registry
  2. Record which checks held, hash, signature, fingerprint, rather than a bare 'verified'
  3. Seal the final export of the asset, with the creator and disclosure declared in your own accurate words
  4. Download and keep both copies the seal produces: the sealed copy as the record, the labelled copy for publication
  5. File the exhibit's verification URL beside the asset wherever your team keeps campaign or client records

A worked example: A client receiving 60 AI campaign images from a contractor

She spot-checked 8 exhibit pages and ran check-a-copy on 3 published versions; all matched the contractor's declarations, and she pasted the verification URLs into the acceptance document instead of writing 'provenance confirmed' on trust.

Notice what made the difference: not a better argument, but a record created before it was needed, carrying dates and hashes a stranger could check. That is the whole pattern this guide recommends, applied at the scale of one team and one deadline.

FAQ

What does it mean if only the fingerprint matches?

That the copy descends from the registered image but its bytes and embedded data changed, the normal state of a published copy. The record's declarations and timestamps still apply to the original it matched.

Is ProvenanceGuard's assertion a C2PA manifest?

No. It is ProvenanceGuard's own signed assertion, embedded as XMP and HMAC-signed, and labelled that way everywhere. The inspection detects genuine C2PA markers when a file carries them, but the two records are never conflated.

What formats and sizes are supported?

JPEG and PNG, up to 25 MB per file. Those are the formats the inspection, XMP embedding and fingerprinting are built and tested against; other formats are refused rather than approximated.

What does the free tier actually do?

The complete job on an asset: byte-level inspection, a signed assertion embedded as XMP, a visibly labelled copy, SHA-256 and perceptual fingerprints registered, and a public verification page. Paid plans add survival re-checks, evidence packs and bulk verification.

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